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The Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt Hon Liam Fox was speaker at a Conference on October 5th 2010, the eve of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.   
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==Strategic Defence and Security Review==
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 +
Prime Minister David Cameron has unveiled details of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).
 +
 
 +
This is the first time that a UK government has taken decisions on its defence, security, intelligence, resilience, development and foreign affairs capabilities in the round, setting out the delivery of the ends set out in the National Security Strategy.
 +
 
 +
 
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It sets out the Government’s determination to make the right decisions for the long term defence and prosperity of the country.<ref>[http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/latest-news/2010/10/strategic-defence-review-55906 strategic defence review]'accessed 16th November 2010</ref>
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The Secretary of State for Defence, the [[Rt. Hon Liam Fox]] was speaker at a Conference on October 5th 2010, the eve of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.   
 
The conference specifically addressed how the government views defence, Britain’s future role in the world, and what the outcomes may be.
 
The conference specifically addressed how the government views defence, Britain’s future role in the world, and what the outcomes may be.
  
The following section reports the main points of Rt. Hon Liam Fox's speech.  
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This demonstrates that First Defence works closely with Policy Makers and the Government. The following section reports the main points of Rt. Hon Liam Fox's speech.  
  
 
==Introduction==
 
==Introduction==
  
I would first like to thanks Caroline, First Defence and [[EADS]] for sponsoring this event. First Defence has done so much over the years to advance the defence debate in the UK. Each and every year the First Defence Fringe becomes more and more popular and I am happy to have been invited once again to speak here.  
+
I would first like to thanks Caroline, [[First Defence]] and [[EADS]] for sponsoring this event. First Defence has done so much over the years to advance the defence debate in the UK. Each and every year the First Defence Fringe becomes more and more popular and I am happy to have been invited once again to speak here.  
  
 
Today, I am going to speak on the future challenges facing defence in the United Kingdom. Here I see two main challenges.  
 
Today, I am going to speak on the future challenges facing defence in the United Kingdom. Here I see two main challenges.  
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Regular defence reviews will mean more incremental changes better matched through the changing nature of the threats we face.  
 
Regular defence reviews will mean more incremental changes better matched through the changing nature of the threats we face.  
  
The one thing I am determined to do whatever the frustrations and whatever the difficulties is that no future defence secretary will inherit the shambles that I have inherited from Labour and that our national security will take its full place in the country’s political priorities.
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The one thing I am determined to do whatever the frustrations and whatever the difficulties is that no future defence secretary will inherit the shambles that I have inherited from Labour and that our national security will take its full place in the country’s political priorities.<ref>[http://www.firstdefence.info/First Defence Events News]First Defence Website accessed 6th November 2010</ref>
  
==Prime Minister David Cameron's Speech to the House of Commons on the Strategic Defence and Security Review==
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==David Cameron's Speech to the House of Commons on the Strategic Defence and Security Review==
  
 
With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement on the Strategic Defence and Security Review.
 
With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement on the Strategic Defence and Security Review.
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This enhanced capability will allow them to remain at “extremely high readiness” for emergency operations through enhanced logistics, medical support and greater intelligence capability to support their operations.
 
This enhanced capability will allow them to remain at “extremely high readiness” for emergency operations through enhanced logistics, medical support and greater intelligence capability to support their operations.
  
Conclusion
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==Conclusion==
 
Mr Speaker, we were left a situation where we had a budget £38 billion overspent armed forces at war, overstretched, under-equipped and ill-prepared for the challenges of the future.
 
Mr Speaker, we were left a situation where we had a budget £38 billion overspent armed forces at war, overstretched, under-equipped and ill-prepared for the challenges of the future.
  
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Mr Speaker, I believe we have begun to deal with all these things sorting out the legacy and fitting Britain’s defences for the future.
 
Mr Speaker, I believe we have begun to deal with all these things sorting out the legacy and fitting Britain’s defences for the future.
  
And I commend this statement to the House.
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And I commend this statement to the House.<ref>[http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/latest-news/2010/10/strategic-defence-review-55906 Defence Response]Number 10 Website,accessed 16th November 2010</ref>
 
 
 
 
 
 
=='The State of The Navy' By Dr. Julian Lewis==
 
 
 
==Summary of the Argument==
 
 
 
l Eight years after emerging apparently victorious from the 1998 Strategic Defence
 
Review, the Royal Navy is bloodied, battered and on the ropes.
 
l An initial sacrifice of three frigates and two submarines has turned into the
 
devastating loss of 14 major frontline vessels – with a prospect of even more being
 
run down or mothballed.
 
l There is a serious prospect of 19 destroyers and frigates having to do the work of 30.
 
l These reckless reductions have been based on the strategic falsehood – the ‘Hoon
 
Excuse’ – that numbers no longer matter in an era of more capable ships.
 
l The reluctant acquiescence of the Admirals has been bought by the promise – as yet
 
unfulfilled – that two Future Aircraft Carriers will be ordered. In the meantime, their
 
target in-service dates of 2012 and 2015 have been abandoned in all but name.
 
l Having admitted that the Armed Forces are involved in more complex and more
 
numerous operations than were anticipated in the Strategic Defence Review, the
 
Government have betrayed the Royal Navy by inflicting massive damage to the front
 
line instead of augmenting it.
 
l The next step in this betrayal is a threat to close one of the United Kingdom’s only
 
three Naval Bases.
 
l The Type 45 destroyer-building programme has been slashed from 12 to eight; only
 
six of these have been ordered; and none is to be fitted with the Tomahawk
 
land-attack cruise missiles requested by the Naval Staff.
 
l The final size of the future submarine fleet is uncertain, but seems likely to consist of
 
only eight, or for a period just seven, boats – apart from those carrying the nuclear
 
deterrent.
 
l This whole sorry saga has provoked a level of concern at the top of the Service
 
unprecedented since the East of Suez controversy in the 1960s, and has led to a
 
degree of public criticism by the former First Sea Lord which it would be perilous to
 
ignore.
 
==The SDR Blueprint==
 
In July 1998, the Strategic Defence Review promised the replacement of “our current
 
carriers from around 2012 by two larger, more versatile carriers capable of carrying a more
 
powerful force”. On the other hand, it was decided to reduce the number of attack
 
submarines “over the next few years from 12 to 10” and the destroyer and frigate fleet
 
from 35 to 32. It was also decided that “22 modern Sandown and Hunt class mine-hunters
 
will be sufficient rather than 25 as previously planned” (paras. 115-6). The then First Sea Lord
 
reluctantly accepted these reductions, given the promise of new carriers.
 
In a supporting essay to the Review, it was concluded that “the ability to deploy offensive
 
air power will be central to future force projection operations. But we cannot be certain that
 
we will always have access to suitable air bases” (Essay six, para. 26). Therefore, the two
 
proposed new carriers would constitute a seaborne base from which a combined force of
 
RN and RAF aircraft would be able to operate.
 
1
 
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2
 
The reduction in the destroyer and frigate total to 32 was based on the numbers needed
 
for “two concurrent medium scale deployments, which is the most demanding
 
requirement for the destroyer and frigate force”; and the loss of two boats from the
 
12-strong attack submarine force was excused on the basis that:
 
“All ten attack submarines will, however, be equipped to fire Tomahawk land attack
 
missiles to increase their utility in force projection operations (this compares with
 
previous plans to fit only seven submarines for the Tomahawk system) … This
 
rebalancing will be matched by adjustments to peacetime tasks where necessary to
 
ensure that overstretch is addressed. At the same time, we will take action to remedy
 
longstanding undermanning within the Royal Navy. In the first instance, most personnel
 
released by the changes set out above will be redeployed across the Service to
 
ameliorate current shortfalls. Once manpower problems have been solved the net effect
 
of the Review on the Navy’s Regular manpower requirement will be a reduction of some
 
1,400.”(Essay six, paras. 24-5)
 
 
 
==The Hoon Excuse==
 
 
 
In December 1999, a Defence White Paper duly noted that the Type 22 frigates HMS
 
Boxer, HMS Beaver and HMS London had been paid off – after only 16, 15 and 12 years’
 
service – and that the submarines HMS Splendid and HMS Spartan would follow suit in
 
2003 and 2006 respectively. Subsequently, the destroyer and frigate force was quietly cut
 
from 32 to 31, on the grounds that the greater power and time at sea of the remaining
 
vessels would compensate for the extra ship which had been lost.
 
This devious technique was elevated into a doctrine by the Secretary of State, Geoff
 
Hoon, in a lecture at the Royal United Services Institute on 26 June 2003. He concluded
 
that “advances in technology” and “the astonishing speed with which we can
 
increasingly operate” meant that:
 
“Measuring the capability of our Armed Forces by the number of units or platforms in their
 
possession will no longer be significant”. (RUSI Journal, August 2003)
 
 
 
==The Plan Abandoned==
 
 
 
In December 2003, another Defence White Paper – entitled “Delivering Security in a
 
Changing World” – again stressed the role of the Royal Navy in projecting force “from
 
the sea onto the land”. It predicted that:
 
“The introduction of the two new aircraft carriers with the Joint Combat Aircraft early in
 
the next decade will offer a step increase in our ability to project air power from the sea.
 
The Type 45 destroyer will enhance protection of joint and maritime forces and assist
 
force projection.”
 
However, a hint of what was to come was clearly visible:
 
“Some of our older vessels contribute less well to the pattern of operations that we
 
envisage, and reductions in their numbers will be necessary.” (Cm 6041-I, para. 4.10)
 
A supporting essay to this White Paper – entitled “Scales of Effort and Military Tasks” –
 
conceded that:
 
“Since SDR our Armed Forces have conducted operations that have been more complex
 
and greater in number than we had envisaged. We have effectively been conducting
 
First defence text pages-FEB 07 8/3/07 10:47 Page 2
 
3
 
continual concurrent operations, deploying further afield, to more places, more
 
frequently and with a greater variety of missions than set out in the SDR planning
 
assumptions. We expect to see a similar pattern of operations in the future, with the
 
emphasis on multiple, concurrent Medium and Small Scale deployments. A major lesson
 
of the last five years is that the Department and the Armed Forces as a whole have to be
 
structured and organised to support a fairly high level of operational activity at all times,
 
not as a regular interruption to preparing for a Large Scale conflict. (Cm 6041-II, para. 2.9)
 
… Building on the methodologies used during SDR New Chapter, we now divide military
 
capability into six key capability elements: Maritime, Land, Air, C4ISR, Special Forces (SF)
 
and Logistics. (Cm 6041-II, para. 2.11)
 
… Our analysis suggests that in some respects – particularly for enabling assets such as
 
deployable HQs, communications and deployed logistical support – several Small Scale
 
operations are potentially more demanding than one or two more substantial operations.
 
This is particularly the case if they are in locations that are geographically remote from each
 
other and the UK. Given the signs that multiple concurrent smaller operations are
 
becoming the norm, our concurrency and endurance assumptions need to focus on each
 
of the six capability elements to ensure that our force structures can cope with this
 
pattern.” (Cm 6041-II, para. 2.12)
 
THE AXE FALLS
 
Despite the White Paper’s admission that operations had been more numerous and varied
 
than the SDR had expected, on 21 July 2004 a Supplement to the White Paper was
 
published, slashing the size of the Fleet. Once again, the praises were sung of the
 
yet-to-be-ordered future carriers and Joint Combat Aircraft, as well as the new assault
 
ships, HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, and the forthcoming Bay class landing ships. It was
 
then argued that:
 
“In the light of the reduced conventional threat, our revised concurrency assumptions
 
and improved networked capability, we assess that we need fewer … platforms.
 
Consequently we have a requirement for 8 Type 45 destroyers and will need 25
 
destroyers and frigates overall … We judge in the light of the reduced threat that an
 
attack submarine fleet of 8 SSNs will be sufficient to meet the full range of tasks.”
 
(Cm 6269, paras. 2.6-7)
 
The Nimrod MR2, with a less important anti-submarine role, could be reduced from a
 
total of 21 to only 16 – and, because of the anticipated “greater range and endurance” of
 
the future MRA4 aircraft, only “about 12” of these would be required to replace the
 
current Nimrods in their surveillance role. As for the mine counter-measures fleet, the
 
total of 22 set out in the SDR would now be cut to just 16. (Cm 6269, paras. 2.8-9)
 
THE STORY SO FAR
 
The logic of the Government’s treatment of the Royal Navy up to this point runs as
 
follows: all the Armed Forces were scaled down at the end of the Cold War, but
 
adjustments were needed to reflect the strategic shift from a defensive role in Europe to
 
the mounting of far-flung operations from a sea base. This required large strike carriers
 
as its centrepiece and a loss of five frigates and submarines was a price apparently worth
 
paying in 1998.
 
First defence text pages-FEB 07 8/3/07 10:47 Page 3
 
4
 
However, instead of being reduced from 35 to 32, the frigate and destroyer force has
 
been slashed from 35 to 25. Instead of being reduced from 12 to 10, the submarine force
 
is being slashed from 12 to a maximum of eight. The carriers – one of which was
 
supposed to be in service by 2012 – have not yet been firmly ordered, and no target
 
in-service dates are now given by the Government, despite its previous willingness to
 
do so. The 12 Type 45 destroyers which were projected, and which have a key role in the
 
air defence of the sea base, have been reduced to a programme of eight; but only six of
 
these have been ordered and ships seven and eight may never be built.
 
Such massive reductions might have been expected if events since the publication of the
 
Strategic Defence Review in July 1998 had shown it to be over-pessimistic in estimating the
 
future threats to our country and its interests. Yet, the opposite is the case: as was
 
admitted in the December 2003 White Paper, the number and variety of operational
 
deployments exceeded the assumptions of the SDR. What has the Government’s response
 
been? It has been drastically to weaken the Royal Navy by reducing the total of its major
 
warships whilst disingenuously arguing that their replacements need be fewer in number
 
because each of them will be more powerful than its predecessor.
 
Such an argument is wholly untenable, given that the capability of the new generation
 
destroyers, submarines and surveillance aircraft was perfectly well known when the
 
original totals required were agreed in the SDR in 1998 – before the Kosovo campaign,
 
before 11 September, before the invasion of Afghanistan and before the overthrow of
 
Saddam Hussein. In the case of the Type 45 destroyers, in particular, not only may the total
 
be as low as half-a-dozen, but the repeated requests of the Royal Navy for these to be fitted
 
with Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles have been flatly refused by the Government.
 
==The Verdict of the Service Chiefs==
 
 
 
There is only one rationale for the devastation brought by the Government to the size of
 
the Royal Navy: money. The First Sea Lord at the time of the 2004 cuts was Admiral Sir Alan
 
West. In 2003, he told the magazine Warships International Fleet Review that “no matter how
 
good a ship is, it can only be in so many places at any one time” – a specific rebuttal of the
 
Hoon argument that the number of “units
 
 
 
  
 
==Notes==
 
==Notes==
 
<references/>
 
<references/>

Latest revision as of 00:38, 19 November 2010

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Prime Minister David Cameron has unveiled details of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).

This is the first time that a UK government has taken decisions on its defence, security, intelligence, resilience, development and foreign affairs capabilities in the round, setting out the delivery of the ends set out in the National Security Strategy.


It sets out the Government’s determination to make the right decisions for the long term defence and prosperity of the country.[1] The Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt. Hon Liam Fox was speaker at a Conference on October 5th 2010, the eve of the Strategic Defence and Security Review. The conference specifically addressed how the government views defence, Britain’s future role in the world, and what the outcomes may be.

This demonstrates that First Defence works closely with Policy Makers and the Government. The following section reports the main points of Rt. Hon Liam Fox's speech.

Introduction

I would first like to thanks Caroline, First Defence and EADS for sponsoring this event. First Defence has done so much over the years to advance the defence debate in the UK. Each and every year the First Defence Fringe becomes more and more popular and I am happy to have been invited once again to speak here.

Today, I am going to speak on the future challenges facing defence in the United Kingdom. Here I see two main challenges.

First, configuring national security structures in such a way that will allow us to be prepared for 21st Century Threats.

Second, being able to do so in what is the most challenging financial environment since the Second World War.

I will take each of these in turn.

Future Threats

As we carry out the much needed Strategic Defence and Security Review, it is important to consider what types of threats we may face in the future and how we can best counter these threats.

We know from bitter historical experience the difficulty of predicting future conflict- either its nature or its location. We cannot base our future security on the assumption that future wars will be like the current ones.

That is why we must maintain generic capability able to adapt to any changing threats as they emerge. This is the adaptive posture the NCS decided on in July.

Since the last Strategic Defence Review in 1998 the world has become a more dangerous place. Trans-national terrorism, nuclear proliferation, the battle for cyberspace and the effects of climate change are all playing a part in destabilising the delicate equilibrium of global security.

The terrorists attacks of 9/11 completely altered the Western view of global security. An attack that cost only $250,000 to stage ended up costing the U.S. economy $80bn.

International terrorism continues to pose a real threat.

Although largely defeated in Iraq, Al-Qa'ida is challenging the stability of Pakistan, the Arabian Peninsula-notably Yemen and the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

While some countries like Libya have given up their WMD ambitions, North Korea has successfully tested two nuclear bombs.

Iran is still intent on acquiring a nuclear weapon and continues to be a net exporter of terrorism.

The nature and behaviour of the regime and the risk of triggering a nuclear arms race in the Middle East makes this a cause of growing anxiety.

Climate Change is forcing us to address new threats. For example, with Polar ice caps melting and piracy rife in some of the world's busiest and warmest shipping lanes; maritime transport in the High North is not only becoming a reality but is also looking attractive for commerce. It is also a potential source of political and military tension.

The possibility of state-on-state warfare, most recently demonstrated by the Russian invasion of Georgia and the subsequent occupation of 20 per cent of its territory, cannot be ruled out. Especially as the competition for scarce resources heats up in some of the world's most unstable regions.

Other threats may seem remote but if they became a reality would have a devastating effect on our way of life:

• biological weapons proliferation and their use by terrorist organisations and other non-state actors;

• nuclear terrorism and dirty bombs;

• and the use of an electromagnetic pulse device which could destroy all electronic and communications infrastructure over a distance of hundreds of miles.

Like it or not, Cyber Warfare is a modern-day reality-not something that 'might' occur in the future as some commentators suggest.

And these threats are occurring on top of our contingent overseas operations like Afghanistan, maritime security in the Gulf, or reacting to natural disasters like the recent floods in Pakistan where the key priorities of the UK aid effort in Pakistan were air transport of relief stores and restoring damaged or destroyed bridges—both provided by the British military.

The multi polarity of the post Cold War era and the speed of globalisation mean that Britain's economic and security interests are increasingly interlinked to others with an unavoidable shared set of interests and the shared importation of strategic risk.

As recent events have shown with the economic crisis, instability in one corner of the globe can quickly affect us all.

Britain's national interests no longer stop at the White Cliffs of Dover, Gibraltar or the Falklands.

This global interdependence has major implications on how we must organise our national (and international) security structures and identify our threats. It goes without saying that the challenges this presents to our Armed Forces are numerous and complex.

The Twenty-first Century strategic environment demands that Western militaries are able to simultaneously conduct war fighting, peacekeeping, continuous deterrence-both conventional and nuclear, and humanitarian disaster relief operations.

Furthermore, it requires Western Governments to supplement these military operations through an array of soft power tools, such as international aid, defence diplomacy, and the spread of information and ideas.

This is why the creation of the National Security Council under the leadership of the Prime Minister is so important.

The NSC recognises how issues like foreign relations, international development, homeland security, energy security and the structure of our Armed Forces themselves are all interlinked and require joined up thinking if we are to both protect our own citizens at home and contribute to global security abroad.

But if the nature of the Twenty-first century forces us- the West- to re-evaluate current war fighting we should assume that our enemies are forced to do the same. It is in this context that we can understand the types of threats we are likely to face in the future.

There is an on-going debate inside in the UK on what form the future of warfare will take. Usually there are two schools of thought. On one side we are told that future conflicts will be asymmetric and irregular in nature-similar to what we commonly experience in Afghanistan today.

On the other side we are told that state-on-state warfare in the traditional sense cannot be ruled out and if anything, however remote the possibility may seem, this form of warfare is likely to pose the biggest threat to UK sovereignty.

The choice between the two schools of thought is not binary and mutually exclusive. It is no more true to say that we will face only asymmetric threats than it is to say we face only state on state threats. The truth lies somewhere in between-in a hybrid form of warfare-that will require an adaptable Britain requiring generic and flexible defence capabilities.

State-on-state warfare is viewed by many as an anachronism in the Twenty-first Century but until there is a radical change in the Westphalian nation-state system that has been around since 1648, state-on-state warfare remains a possibility-and one that we must be prepared for regardless of how unlikely it may seem today. There is always the possibility of the UK being dragged into state on state warfare between other nations.

But even state-on-state warfare may not necessarily take the same linear, symmetric, and conventional form as it did in the Twenty-first century.

The present superiority of Western conventional military might, coupled with the advantages offered by globalisation, have led our adversaries to look beyond the approach of choosing between conventional and asymmetrical types of warfare and adopt a hybrid warfare approach.

Potential adversaries may confront us with conventional military might that is at, on occasions, equal to Western technology.

But it is more likely that, knowing that they cannot match our technology, resources or conventional firepower our adversaries will resort to strategic and tactical asymmetric measures in an attempt to defeat us.

With hybrid warfare we should assume that our adversaries will simultaneously employ a mix of conventional weapons and irregular tactics that may even include organised crime and acts of terrorism.

We must understand that the conflicts of the future will go beyond the conventional arena and threaten our social well-being, our domestic infrastructure and our economic capabilities. Russia's invasion of Georgia, with heavy armour, air strikes and ground troops-all very conventional- was augmented by a surgical cyber attack on the Georgian Government and a sophisticated information operations campaign aimed at the Georgian people and the international community.

The changing scope and nature of these threats have implications for our procurement plans. We need to focus more on capability and less on specific equipment.

Saying that we can only focus on one particular type of threat is not good enough for the British people and would be an easy way out for any government whose first and foremost responsibility is the defence of the realm.

Financial Situation

If we learned anything from the Cold War it was that the stronger your economy the more secure your national security. We defeated the Soviet threat because we prevailed in the ideological battle but we also out spent largely because of the strength of the Western economies. Today, we find ourselves in the appalling situation where the out going Labour Chief Secretary actually leaves a note that says “Sorry, there is no money left”.

Labour’s failed economic policies saw our national debt double.

Now, I didn't come into politics wishing to see a reduction in our Defence budget.

Neither did David Cameron.

Indeed, we have both often argued in the past that in a dangerous world – the world in which we live - there is a strong case to increase our spending on national security.

But while we can never predict where events will take us or the unavoidable bills we will have to pay as a consequence, we must confront the ghastly truth of Labour's legacy.

Next year the interest bill alone for Labour’s debt will be over £46bn – more than the entire Defence budget for the UK.

There is an unfunded liability in Defence of around £38 billion over the next 10 years.

During their time in office Labour pushed projects ever more desperately into future years to try to make an impossible budget balance in year, only to increase the overall cost of the Defence programme still further.

They behaved like someone who has just received a catalogue in the post and who keeps ordering more and more items from it without once considering whether they might have the income to pay for any of them when the goods arrive.

The price of this irresponsibility will ultimately be paid for by short-term reductions as we try to return Defence to a sound footing.

So we face the SDSR with unavoidably constrained finances.


Conclusion

We will not be able to do all that we would like at least not in the short term but we will create better stability for planning for both the military and the defence industry.

The Defence Reform Unit which I recently established will radically reform the MoD itself and along with the service chiefs look at issues such as rank structure and force generation where review is long over due.

Regular defence reviews will mean more incremental changes better matched through the changing nature of the threats we face.

The one thing I am determined to do whatever the frustrations and whatever the difficulties is that no future defence secretary will inherit the shambles that I have inherited from Labour and that our national security will take its full place in the country’s political priorities.[2]

David Cameron's Speech to the House of Commons on the Strategic Defence and Security Review

With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement on the Strategic Defence and Security Review.

There are four things to say upfront.

First, this is not simply a cost-saving exercise to get to grips with the biggest budget deficit in post-war history it is about taking the right decisions to protect our national security in the years ahead.

But the two are not separate.

Our National Security depends on our economic strength and vice versa.

As our national security is a priority so defence and security budgets will contribute to deficit reduction on a lower scale than most other departments.

Over four years the defence budget will rise in cash terms and fall by only 8 per cent.

And it will meet the NATO 2 per cent of GDP target for defence spending throughout the next four years.

But this Government has inherited a £38 billion black hole in the future defence plans bigger than the entire annual defence budget of £33 billion.

Sorting this out is not just vital for tackling the deficit but vital to protecting our national security.

Second, this Review is about how we project power and influence in a rapidly changing world.

We are the sixth largest economy in the world.

Even after this Review we expect to continue with the fourth largest military budget in the world.

We have a unique network of alliances and relationships with the United States as a member of the EU and NATO and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

We have one of the biggest aid programmes in the world one of the biggest networks of Embassies a time zone that allows us to trade with Asia in the morning and the Americas in the evening and a language that is spoken across the globe.

Our national interest requires our full and active engagement in world affairs.

It requires our economy to compete with the strongest and the best.

And it requires too that we stand up for the values we believe in.

Britain has punched above its weight in the world.

And we should have no less ambition for our country in the decades to come.

But we need to be more thoughtful, more strategic and more co-ordinated in the way we advance our interests and protect our national security.

That is what this Review sets out to achieve.

Third, I want to be clear there is no cut whatsoever in the support for our forces in Afghanistan.

The funding for our operations in Afghanistan comes not from the budget of the Ministry of Defence but instead from the Treasury Special Reserve.

So the changes to the Ministry of Defence that result from today’s Review will not affect this funding.

Furthermore, every time the Chiefs have advised me that a particular change might have implications for our operations in Afghanistan either now or in the years to come I have heeded that advice.

In fact we have been and will be providing more for our brave forces in Afghanistan more equipment to counter the threat from IEDs more training and training equipment more protected vehicles – like the warthog heavy protection vehicle which will be out there by the end of the year more surveillance capability, including unmanned aircraft systems and crucially, at last, the right level of helicopter capability.

Fourth, this Review has been very different from those before it.

It has looked at all elements of national security, home and abroad, together, not just defence on its own.

It’s been led from the top with all the relevant people around the table and it will be repeated every five years.

A step change Mr Speaker, this Review sets out a step change in the way we protect this country’s security interests.

From a Ministry of Defence that is too big, too inefficient and too over-spent to a Department that is smaller, smarter, and more responsible in its spending.

From a strategy over-reliant on military intervention to a higher priority for conflict prevention.

From concentrating on conventional threats to a new focus on unconventional threats.

And from armed forces that are overstretched, under-equipped and deployed too often without appropriate planning to the most professional and most flexible modern forces in the world, fully equipped for the challenges of the future.

Mr Speaker, let me take each in turn.

Ministry of Defence First, the MOD.

Even though the MOD will get real growth in its budget next year the Department will face some significant challenges.

So the MOD will cut its Estate, dispose of unnecessary assets, renegotiate contracts with industry.

…and cut its management overheads, including reducing civilian numbers in the MOD by 25,000 by 2015.

We will also adjust and simplify civilian and military allowances.

The new operational allowance stays but there will be difficult decisions, although these will be made easier by the return of the army from Germany.

Taken together, all these changes in the MOD will save £4.7 billion over the Spending review period.

Getting to grips with procurement is vital.

Take the Nimrod programme for example.

It has cost the British taxpayer over £3bn.

The number of aircraft to be procured has fallen from 21 to 9.

The cost per aircraft has increased by over 200 per cent and it’s over 8 years late.

Today we are cancelling it.

Conflict prevention Second, from military intervention to conflict prevention.

Mr Speaker, Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the immense financial and human costs of large scale military interventions.

While we must retain the ability to undertake such operations we must also get better at treating the causes of instability, not just dealing with the consequences.

When we fail to prevent conflict and have to resort to military intervention, the costs are always far higher.

We will expand our capability to deploy military and civilian teams to support stabilisation efforts and build capacity in other states.

And we will double our investment in aid for fragile and unstable countries so by 2015 just under a third of the budget of the Department for International Development will be spent on conflict prevention.

Unconventional threats Third, we need to focus more of our resources

not on the conventional threats of the past but on the unconventional threats of the future.

Over the next four years, we will invest over half a billion pounds of new money in a national cyber security programme.

This will significantly enhance our ability to detect and defend against cyber attacks and fix shortfalls in the critical cyber infrastructure on which the whole country now depends.

We will continue to prioritise tackling the terrorist threat both from Al Qaeda and its affiliates and from dissident republicans in Northern Ireland.

Although efficiencies will need to be made we are giving priority to continuing investment in our world-class intelligence agencies.

And we will sharpen our readiness to act on civil emergencies, energy security, organised crime, counter proliferation and border security.

Armed Forces Fourth, from armed forces that are over-stretched and under-equipped we need to move to the most professional and most flexible modern forces in the world.

Mr Speaker, we inherited an Army with scores of tanks in Germany but that was until recently forced to face the deadly threat of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan in Land Rovers designed for Northern Ireland.

We have a Royal Air Force hampered in its efforts to support our forces overseas because of an ageing strategic airlift fleet and a Royal Navy locked into a cycle of ever smaller numbers of ever more expensive ships.

Mr Speaker, we can not go on like this.

The White Paper we have published today sets out a clear vision for the future structure of our Armed Forces.

The precise budgets will be agreed in future spending reviews.

My own strong view is that this structure will require year on year real-terms growth in the defence budget in the years beyond 2015.

Between now and then the Government is committed to the vision of 2020 set out in this Review and will make decisions accordingly.

We are also absolutely determined that the MOD will become much more commercially hard headed in future and adopt a much more aggressive drive for efficiencies.

The transition from the mess we inherited to that coherent future force will be a difficult process, especially in the current economic conditions.

But we are determined to take the necessary steps.

Our ground forces will continue to have a vital operational role so we will retain a large well-equipped Army, numbering around 95,500 by 2015 that is 7,000 less than today.

We will continue to be one of very few countries able to deploy a self-sustaining properly equipped Brigade-sized force anywhere around the world and sustain it indefinitely if needs be.

And we will be able to put 30,000 into the field for a major, one off operation.

In terms of the return from Germany half our personnel should be back by 2015 and the remainder by 2020.

And tanks and heavy artillery numbers will be reduced by around 40%.

But the introduction of 12 new heavy lift Chinook helicopters new protected mobility vehicles and enhanced communications equipment will make the Army more mobile, more flexible and better equipped to face future threats than ever before.

We will also review the structure of our Reserve forces to ensure we make the most efficient use of their skills, experience and outstanding capabilities.

This will be chaired by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, General Houghton with my Honorable Friend the Member for Canterbury who serves in the Reserves acting as his deputy.

Mr Speaker, the Royal Navy will be similarly equipped to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.

We are procuring a fleet of the most capable nuclear powered hunter-killer astute class submarines anywhere in the world.

Able to operate in secret across the world’s oceans these submarines will also feed vital strategic intelligence back to the UK and to our military forces across the world.

We will complete the production of six Type 45 destroyers one of the most effective multi-role destroyers in the world.

But we will also start a new programme to develop less expensive, more flexible, modern frigates.

Total naval manpower will reduce to around 30,000 by 2015.

And by 2020 the total number of frigates and destroyers will reduce from 23 to 19 but the fleet as a whole will be better able to take on today’s tasks from tackling drug trafficking and piracy to counter-terrorism.

Mr Speaker, the Royal Air Force will also need to take some tough measures in the coming years to ensure a strong future.

We have decided to retire the Harrier which has served this country so well for 40 years.

The Harrier is a remarkably flexible aircraft but the military advice is that we should sustain the Tornado fleet as that aircraft is more capable and better able to sustain operations in Afghanistan.

RAF manpower will also reduce to around 33,000 by 2015.

Inevitably this will mean changes in the way in which some RAF bases are used but some are likely to be required by the Army as forces return from Germany.

We owe it to communities up and down the country who have supported our armed forces for many years to engage with them before final decisions are taken.

Mr Speaker, by the 2020s, the Royal Air Force will be based around a fleet of two of the most capable fighter jets anywhere in the world a modernised Typhoon fleet fully capable of air-to-air and air-to-ground missions; and the Joint Strike Fighter, the world’s most advanced multi-role combat jet.

This fleet will be complemented by a growing fleet of Unmanned Air Vehicles

And the A400M transport aircraft together with the existing fleet of C17 aircraft and the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft will allow us to fly our forces wherever they are needed in the world.

Prepared for the unexpected Mr Speaker, as we refocus our resources on the most likely threats to our security so we will remain vigilant against all possible threats and retain the capability to react to the unexpected.

So as we cut back on tanks and heavy artillery we will retain the ability to regenerate those capabilities if needs be.

And while in the short term the ability to deploy airpower from the sea is unlikely to be essential over the longer term, we cannot assume that bases for land-based aircraft will always be available when and where we need them.

So we will ensure the UK has carrier strike capability for the future.

Mr Speaker, this is another area where the last Government got it badly wrong.

There’s only one thing worse than spending money you don’t have.

And that’s buying the wrong things with it – and doing so in the wrong way.

The carriers they ordered are unable to work effectively with our key defence partners, the United States or France.

They had failed to plan so carriers and planes would arrive at the same time.

They ordered the more expensive, less capable version of the Joint Strike Fighter to fly off the carriers.

And they signed contracts so we were left in a situation where even cancelling the second carrier would cost more than to build it.

I have this in written confirmation from BAE systems.

That is the legacy we inherited.

An appalling legacy the British people have every right to be angry about.

But I say to them today – this Government will act in the national interest.

We would not have started from here but the right decisions are now being made in the right way and for the right reasons.

Mr Speaker, it will take time to rectify these mistakes but this is how we will do so.

We will build both carriers, but hold one in extended readiness.

We will fit the “cats and traps” – the catapults and arrestor gear to the operational carrier.

This will allow our allies to operate from our operational carrier and allow us to buy the carrier version of the Joint Strike Fighter which is more capable, less expensive, has a longer range and carries more weapons.

We will also aim to bring the planes and carriers in at the same time.

Finally, Mr Speaker, we can not dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge.

So we will retain and renew the ultimate insurance policy – our independent nuclear deterrent, which guards this country round the clock every day of the year.

We have completed a value for money review of our future deterrent plans.

As a result we can:

…extend the life of the Vanguard class so that the first replacement submarine is not required until 2028;

…reduce the number of operational launch tubes on those new submarines from 12 to eight…

…reduce the number of warheads on our submarine at sea from 48 to 40…..

…and reduce our stockpile of operational warheads from less than 160 to fewer than 120.

The next phase of the programme to renew our deterrent will start by the end of this year.

But as a result of the changes to the programme, the decision to start construction of the new submarines need not now be taken until around 2016.

We will save around £1.2 billion and defer a further £2 billion of spending from the next ten years.

So yes, Mr Speaker, we will save money.

But we will retain and renew a credible, continuous and effective minimum nuclear deterrent that will stand constant guard over this nation’s security.

Finally, Mr Speaker, the immense contribution of our highly professional Special Forces is necessarily largely unreported but their immense capability is recognised all across the world.

We are significantly increasing our investment in our Special Forces to ensure they remain at the leading edge of operational capability prepared to meet current and future threats, and maintaining their unique and specialist role.

This enhanced capability will allow them to remain at “extremely high readiness” for emergency operations through enhanced logistics, medical support and greater intelligence capability to support their operations.

Conclusion

Mr Speaker, we were left a situation where we had a budget £38 billion overspent armed forces at war, overstretched, under-equipped and ill-prepared for the challenges of the future.

And the biggest budget deficit in post-war history.

Mr Speaker, I believe we have begun to deal with all these things sorting out the legacy and fitting Britain’s defences for the future.

And I commend this statement to the House.[3]

Notes

  1. strategic defence review'accessed 16th November 2010
  2. Defence Events NewsFirst Defence Website accessed 6th November 2010
  3. Defence ResponseNumber 10 Website,accessed 16th November 2010